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Abstract 
The paper investigates the nexus between the structure of union 
wage bargaining and workers' preferences for status, which is 
measured by relative wages. For two types of workers it is shown 
that due to externalities on the other group's status wages of 
both types of workers will be lower if an encompassing union 
negotiates for the whole workforce than if different groups of 
workers are unionized separately. Moreover, unemployment will be 
reduced by the central union relative to separate negotiations 
even if unions are not concerned with employment effects of wage 
negotiations at all. 
I. Introduction 
The link between efficiency wages and union ~age bargaining has 
already been established in the literature: Hoel (1989) shows 
that the presence of unions aggrevates the unemployment caused 
by efficiency wage considerations. If bargaining takes place at 
a local level, it unambiguously gives a higher negotiated wage 
than the wage set by firms in the absence of unions. Under 
central bargaining this will happen if the firms' labor demand 
elasticity is sufficiently large. These results are obtained 
upon the assumption that the union utility function only depends 
of wages, i.e. V = V(w). 
This paper investigates the economic impact of union bargaining 
if workers are not only concerned for wages but a~so care for 
relative wages and status, as stressed by Hicks (1975), Akerlof 
and Yellen (1988) and Frank (1984). If unions take into account 
. 
these preferences in the bargaining process, the outcome for 
wages and employment will depend on whether an encompassing 
union represents all workers within the firm or if a single 
union negotiates for only a part of the workforce. For 
simplicity it will be assumed that there are only two groups of 
workers that can be unionized seperately. In general, unions 
will adopt wage policies designed to raise wages above the level 
unilaterally set by the firm in any case. However, if a union is 
represe~ting the firm's whole workforce, wages will be more 
moderate and employment will be higher for both groups of 
workers than with separate negotiations. This occurs since a 
central union within the firm .takes into consideration the 
negative externality of higher wages of one group of workers on 
the other workers' status resp. relative wages. If the 
externality of paying high wages is sufficiently strong, the 
· ht ven reduce the level of wages below central union m1g e 
standard efficiency wages minimizing the firm's cost of 
efficient labor. In this case Heel's result would be reversed, 
so that wages would fall due to union activities relative to the 
level set by firms unilaterally. Thus employment would be higher 
with than without union'negotiations. 
The insight that central union bargaining will lead to lower 
unemployment rates than·separate union bargaining is not a new 
one: e.g. Hoel (1989) pas shown that employment will be higher 
with central union bargaining. This occurs since the central 
union takes care of employment-effects when raising wages. 
Although this paper derives a similar conclusion it is based on 
a different argument: even if the central union does not take 
account of unemployment it will increase employment by 
mitigating the effort-competition between workers, resulting in 
a reductions of wages for both groups. 
The paper proceeds as follows: section II presents the behavior 
of the firm. Section III analyzes the union's objective, section 
IV is concerned with both central and separate union bargaining. 
II. The firm 
If it is prohibitively costly for firms to monitor workers' 
labor input directly, it can nevertheless influence it 
indirectly if effort can be enhanced by higher wages, yielding 
an efficiency-wage context. Thus, the wage rate is either 
unilaterally set by firms or alternatively it is negotiated in 
a bargain between firms and the union (in the latter case the 
firm . l f 
' 
15 et free to select employment subsequently), leaving 
the choice of effort to workers in both cases. 
output is produced by two kinds of "efficient labor": Y = Y ( e
1
L
1
, 
ez½) with Y,<o, Y11<0, Y2<o, Y22<o. It is sold at a competitive 
narket at a price p=l. The firm maximizes its profits P: 
In the absence of unions, the firm will select wages and 
employment by calculating the following first-order conditions: 
(6) P' (w1): Y1L1 · de1/dw1 + Y2Lz· de2/dw1 L, = 0 
(7) P' (w2 ) : Y2Lz· de2/dw2 + Y1L1 de1/dw2 Lz = 0 
(8) p I (L,) : y1e 1 - w, = 0 
(9) P' (½): y2e 2 - w2 = 0 
with yi = dY/d (e;Li}, i = 1, 2. According to (6) and (7) the firm 
choose wages so that the marginal product of an increase of 
wages in terms of efficiency units of both workers is equal to 
marginal costs. Workers being concerned for status, the reaction 
of effort with respect to the other worker's wage will be 
negative. Employment will be adjusted according to (8) and (9), 
so that each worker gets a wage per effort equal to his marginal 
product. Second-order conditions will insure that d 2 P/(dw;) 2 <0 
and d 2 P/(dLi) 2 <0, i=l,2, at the optimal solution. 
III. The Obvective Function of the Union 
A modified version of the Stone-Gea.ry utility function can be 
used in order to incorporate workers' preferences for status 
into the union's utility function. For each group of workers 
within establishments that can be unionized separately it has 
the form 
i=l,2, 
where Li stands for employment and Ui(·) is the union's utility 
from the pay-variables wages W; and status resp. relative wages 
n. with n. = w./w., i,j = 1,2, ifj 2. The relative value of e and 
I I 1 J 
~ is an indicator of the relative weight of employment and pay-
2In an efficiency-wage context effort could be included as 
an additional argument in (10). Yet it can be shown that results 
could not be affected as long as workers are left free to choose 
effort by themselves. Thus workers' utility would be strictly 
increasing in both wages and status as suggested by (10). 
variables in the union's obj~ctives. For simplicity the absolute 
~ini~u~ level of wages and employment levels that the union can 
tolerate have been set equal to zero. If a union is negotiating 
for only one group of workers within the firm its objective 
function is given by (10). The union representing the whole 
,.:or}:force of the !inn is supposed to maximize the sum of the 
separate unions' objectives: 
(11} v = v, + V2 •· · 
rv. Union wage Bargaining 
fnco~passing Union 
If a right-to-r:ianage model is assumed to hold, the union can 
bargain over the wage and the firm retains the right to 
detcrnine ernployr:ient subsequently. In the bargaining process, 
the firrn wants its profits P to be as large as possible, whereas 
the cnco::,passing union wishes (11) to get as large as possible. ,._,r.; 
If the generalized Nash bargaining solution is used as solution 
concept, the weighted average of the gains to the union and to 
the firn G will be maximized: 
( 1 2 ) G = V8 • PH 
B reflects the relative_ bargaining strength of the union. For 
the sake of sir:iplicity it has been supposed that both v and p 
will be zero in case no settlement between the parties can be 
found (i.e. if a s~rike occurs). If the union is representing 
the whole workforce, the first-order condi'ti·on · · for w1 (a similar 
relationship holds for w2 ) is given by: 
(13) [B/V) l a L,8" , u, < . > • . L, ' < w, ) + t L, 9u, ( . > , _, . u, ' ( w, > + 
+ 
+ [(l-B)/PJ·P'(w1 ) = 0 
Separate Unions 
If different groups of workers are organized separately, (10) is 
maximized for i=l, 2. We assume that both kinds of labor are 
essential in production, so that the firm's threat point is not 
shifted in the separate negotiations as it cannot make positive 
profits by continuing production with the other group of workers 
(see Horn and Wolinsky 1988). In this case 
(14) G = Vi 8•P1' 8 , i = 1 1 2 
is going to be maximized. 
negotiations with union 1 yield: 
First-order conditions for 
+ [(1-.B)/P]·P'(w1) = 0 
Comparision 
since P'(w1) is negative at the firm's optimum, the wage 
negotiated will be increased by union bargaining if the first 
term of the r.h.s. of (13) resp. (15) is positive. 
At first it is advantageous to look at a special case of these 
solutions. If the union's objective is maximization 9f only pay-
variables, 8 1 = e2 = 0 and~,= ~2 = 1, first-order conditions ar~ 
reduced to: 
( 16) [ B /V] • ( U 1 1 ( W 1) + U 2 1 ( W 1 ) ] + [ ( 1-B) / P] · P 1 ( W 1 ) = 0 
for the encompassing union resp. 
( 1 7 ) [ B /V 1 ] • U ,' ( w 1 ) + [ ( 1-B) / P] · P 1 ( W 1) = 0 
for separate wage bargaining. We immediately recognize that 
wages will unambiguously be lower and employment will be higher 
if an encompassing union is representing all workers of the firm 
than in case of separate wage bargaining ... This result is 
obtained since the central union takes into account the negative 
spillover from an increase 
[dU2/dn2J· [w2/w,i] being strictly 
brackets on the l.h.s. in smaller 
the above result. 
in w1 on n2 : U2 ' (w1) = 
negative, the first term in 
in (16) than in (17), yielding 
If the externality on the other workers' status is sufficiently 
strong, it is even possible that U1 ' (w1) > - U2 ' (w1). In this case 
the central union would reduce wages below the level which would 
unilaterally be chosen by firms. Thus unemployment would be 
mitigated by union bargaining in this case even if the union is 
only concerned with the pay-variables income and status and does 
not care for employment ·at all. It is to be noted that result 
cannot be derived in ca~e of separate negotiations but only if 
the preferences of all workers are taken account of 
simultaneously in the bargaining process, so that the 
externality can be internalized. 
Wea}:er results are obtained in the general case where e1 , e2 > o 
holds. By comparing (13) and (15) it is easy to show that under 
these circumstances a central union will still negotiate for 
lower wages than separate unions if: 
(18) 
au,;u, 
dw1/w1 
> 
or if }he elasticity of union utility with respect to the own 
wage is larger than the elasticity of the other union's utility 
with respect to the own wage. In general it can be assumed that 
condition (18) will be met. 
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